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Since the early twentieth century, observers have attributed the wide variation in state bankruptcy 
rates to variation in state legal rules such as garnishment and bankruptcy exemptions. Recent 
econometric analyses, however, conclude that legal rules do not matter. We explore the impact of 
legal rules on bankruptcy rates using a new technique—fixed effects vector decomposition—to 
exploit historical variation in legal rules. The technique allows us to estimate the impact of time-
invariant legal rules in a fixed effects framework. We find that the variation in state legal rules 
explains much of the variation in state wage earner bankruptcy rates for 1926 to 1932. 
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Legal Rules and Bankruptcy Rates:  
Historical Evidence from the States 
 
 
In 2005, after nearly a decade of lobbying by consumer creditors, Congress passed the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act.
1  The Act was intended to reduce the 
bankruptcy rate by reducing the benefits of filing for bankruptcy.  The premise underlying the Act is 
central to law and economics: changes in the law can cause changes in the choices people make. 
There is, however, considerable disagreement over the extent to which legal rules, as opposed to 
economic or social factors, influence the decision to file for bankruptcy.  For instance, although the 
increasing bankruptcy rate in the 1980s was initially attributed to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978 (Shepard, 1984; Boyes and Faith, 1986), later research raised doubts about this conclusion 
(Domowitz and Eovaldi, 1993), and the bankruptcy rate continued to rise despite 1984 amendments 
intended to make bankruptcy less attractive.  
Although bankruptcy is a federal law, states determine what property is exempt from 
collection.
2 States also regulate the alternatives to bankruptcy, that is, the types of non-bankruptcy 
collection procedures that creditors may use. Since the early years of the twentieth century variation 
in these legal rules has been cited as one of the primary causes of variations in state bankruptcy rates 
(e.g. U.S. Department of Justice, 1905), but several econometric analyses of variations in state 
bankruptcy rates have called into question the importance of these legal rules (Shiers and 
Williamson, 1987; Buckley and Brinig, 1998; Weiss et al., 2001).  Lawrence Weiss, Jagdeep Bhandari 
and Russell Robins (2001:419), for example, conclude that, “manipulation of a particular state’s legal 
rules—for instance, by altering personal exemption levels in bankruptcy or by changing the 
                                                 
1 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.  See Nunez and Rosenthal (2004) on the political economy of creditors’ lobbying 
activities.  
2 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 created federal exemptions, but states still determine whether or not their citizens 
are allowed to use these federal exemptions or required to use exemptions specified by the state..    4
percentage of wages subject to garnishment outside of bankruptcy—is unlikely to have much impact 
on the number of bankruptcies filed in that state.” These studies conclude that the variation in state 
bankruptcy rates is attributable to variation in economic and social variables rather than legal rules. 
It may be the case that the historical emphasis on legal rules was misguided, but there are 
two reasons to suspect that existing studies underestimate the influence of legal rules.  The first 
reason is that the existing studies using panel data employ fixed effects (Weiss et al., 2001; Buckley 
and Brinig, 1998). The methodological problem in using fixed effects to study the influence of legal 
rules on bankruptcy rates is that the rules are fairly stable over time.   Fixed effects absorb the 
impact of these time-invariant variables (Hausman and Taylor, 1981).  As Michelle White (2006) 
observed regarding Frank Buckley and Margaret Brinig’s analysis, “the state dummy variables 
capture the effect of the states’ initial exemption levels, while the exemption variables themselves 
capture the effect of changes in exemptions.” Not surprisingly, then, the studies that employ fixed 
effects models tend to conclude that legal rules do not matter.   
The second reason to suspect that recent studies underestimate the influence of legal rules is 
that they use data from the 1980s and 1990s.  Since the late 1960s federal legislation and court 
decisions have restricted state collection laws, reducing the state-to-state variation in legal rules.  For 
example, by the 1990s more than two-thirds of states had wage exemptions set at the federal 
minimum.  
To remedy these problems we combine a new econometric technique with historical data. 
We use a technique developed by Thomas Pluemper and Vera Troeger (forthcoming) that allows us 
to estimate the importance of time-invariant legal variables within a fixed effect framework.  We 
apply their fixed effect vector decomposition procedure in the estimation of state wage earner 
bankruptcy rates during the years 1926 to 1932, when greater variation in state legal rules existed.  
Also, for this period there exists a measure of the severity of garnishment law that takes into   5
consideration procedural aspects of the law as well as the level of wage exemption.  Thus, our 
method and data are well-suited to an inquiry of the extent to which legal rules can influence 
bankruptcy rates.  
We find a strong relationship between bankruptcy rates and legal rules, especially laws 
regarding garnishment and the maximum legal interest rate, and, to a lesser degree, exemptions in 
bankruptcy itself.  We further find that variables measuring social capital, such as church 
membership, have great influence on the bankruptcy rate.  
 
I. Institutional Background: Bankruptcy, Exemptions and Garnishment 
  The origins of American bankruptcy law can be traced to the first English bankruptcy law 
enacted in 1542. Bankruptcy law provides an alternative to traditional creditors’ remedies, which are 
referred to as “first-come, first-served” or “grab” laws because the priority of claims is determined 
by the order in which creditors take legal action. Bankruptcy law, in contrast, provides for the 
liquidation of the debtor’s assets and a pro rata distribution of the proceeds among like creditors. 
Although many people now regard the debtor’s discharge as a central feature of bankruptcy law, 
discharge was not introduced until 1705 (Tabb, 1991). These two features—the equitable 
distribution of the debtor’s assets among creditors and the discharge of the debtor—are the defining 
characteristics of Anglo-American bankruptcy law.  
In the United States bankruptcy law is federal law.  The Constitution specifically empowers 
Congress to enact uniform laws on bankruptcy.
3  Congress, however, did not exercise this power for 
most of the nineteenth century. A law was passed in 1800 and repealed in 1803. A second law was 
passed in 1841 and repealed in 1843. A third law was passed in 1867 and repealed in 1879.  A 
                                                 
3 Warren (1935) was the standard reference on the history of bankruptcy law in the United States for over fifty years, but 
in the last two decades the history of American bankruptcy law has been rewritten. See for example Balleisen (2001), 
Carruthers and Halliday (1998), Hansen (1998; 2000), Hansen and Hansen (forthcoming), Mann (2003), Sandage (2005), 
and Skeel (2001).   6
permanent law was passed in 1898.  The 1898 Bankruptcy Act remained in effect until it was 
replaced by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (also known as the Bankruptcy Code, or simply the 
Code).
4  
Although several amendments were enacted between 1898 and 1926, the law that was in 
effect during the period we study was essentially the law passed in 1898. The 1898 Bankruptcy Act 
allowed creditors to petition the court to begin bankruptcy proceedings against a debtor (involuntary 
petitions), and the Act allowed debtors to petition for bankruptcy (voluntary petitions).  Creditors 
were barred, however, from filing petitions against wage earners or farmers.  
Procedure subsequent to the petition was the same in all cases.  Other collection actions, 
such as garnishment, were stopped; a meeting of creditors was called; the debtor’s non-exempt 
assets were liquidated and the proceeds were distributed on a pro rata basis among like creditors.  
The debtor could then apply for a discharge. Usually only fraudulent or illegal behavior prevented a 
discharge.
5   
Although the 1898 law was entitled “An Act to Establish A Uniform System of 
Bankruptcy,” it did not bring about complete uniformity across the states. Prior to 1898 most states 
had already enacted exemption laws that placed limits on the property that could be taken to satisfy 
a creditor’s claim.  The 1898 Bankruptcy Act allowed states to determine the level of exemptions 
that would apply in bankruptcy as well. States typically defined both homestead exemptions and 
personal property exemptions.  Most states defined homestead exemptions in dollars, but some 
states specified exemptions in terms of a quantity of land (see Appendix A).  By the 1930s about 
two-thirds of states defined personal exemptions in dollars, but 13 states exempted only an itemized 
list of assets, such as family Bibles, items of clothing, and tools of the trade.   
                                                 
4 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.  
5  Repayment plans for people with regular income (Chapter 13) and corporate reorganization (Chapter 11) were 
incorporated into bankruptcy law in the 1930s. The 1898 Act did contain a provision for compositions between debtors 
and creditors, but the provision was rarely used.    7
States rarely changed exemptions.  Table 1 shows homestead exemptions in 1883, 1920 and 
1932 (Goodman, 1993; Wickens, 1936; see also National Association of Credit Men, various years). 
Only seven states changed homestead exemptions in half a century; only two states changed 
homestead exemptions between 1920 and 1933. The stability of exemptions is important for the 
analysis of bankruptcy rates because it suggests that exemption laws are not influenced by 
bankruptcy rates and can be treated as exogenous.  Research on exemption levels in the 1990s 
supports this conclusion; the only variable that had a significant influence on the exemptions a state 
had in the 1990s was the exemptions the state had in 1920 (Hynes et al., 2001).  
In the Code, Congress attempted to create greater uniformity in exemptions by establishing a 
federal exemption and allowing petitioners to choose between the federal exemption and their 
state’s exemption. However, the Code also gave states the right to opt out of this dual system. If a 
state opted out, petitioners in the state had to use the state’s exemptions. By 1990, all but 13 states 
had opted out. Congress had a small degree of success in promoting greater uniformity, but 
exemption levels in bankruptcy continue to be determined primarily by the states. 
In contrast to its limited influence on exemptions in bankruptcy, the federal government has 
had considerable influence on garnishment law. Garnishment is the most important legal collection 
tool for creditors when wage earners default (White, 1998:212). Garnishment allows a creditor to 
obtain assets that belong to the debtor but that are in the hands of a third party.  Garnishment can 
apply to bank accounts or other assets, but it is generally used to obtain wages that have not yet been 
paid. 
State garnishment laws vary in the amount of wages that are exempted from collection and 
in how difficult it is to garnish someone’s wages.  In summarizing how the difficulty of garnishing 
wages varied between states in the 1930s, Rolf Nugent, John Hamm and Frances Jones (1936:2) 
explained: “In most States, garnishments are issued after judgment.  In some states, however, a   8
garnishment order may be issued simultaneously with the filing of the complaint by the creditor, and 
in others the garnishment may be issued only after a levy on property in execution of judgment has 
been returned unsatisfied.”  While some procedural differences may exist today, they are not 
captured in econometric analyses, which include only the easy-to-quantify level of wage exemption. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, some states exempted all or most of the debtor’s wages from 
garnishment while others exempted little from garnishment.  The variation in garnishment law has 
been considerably diminished by the federal government. The 1968 Consumer Credit Protection Act 
limited garnishment to 25 percent of take-home pay or the excess of the debtor’s take-home pay 
over 30 times the federal minimum wage.  As of 1992, 34 states limited garnishment to the federal 
maximum of 25 percent (White 1998:208).  In 1969, the Supreme Court also reduced some of the 
variation in garnishment by restricting the use of prejudgment attachments of wages (Sniadich vs. 
Family Finance Corporation 395 U.S. 337). In sum, the legal rules in the 1920s and 1930s exhibited 
greater variation than has been the case since the late 1960s. Exploiting historical data allows us to 
more accurately assess the extent to which state legal rules are capable of influencing the bankruptcy 
rate.  
While the period under consideration has a number of feature to commend it, it might 
reasonably be questioned whether a data set that includes the beginning of the Great Depression 
could have any relevance for other periods. The years from 1926 to 1932 were, however, fairly 
typical for wage earner bankruptcy in the Twentieth Century. Figure 1 puts the period in context by 
showing the wage earner bankruptcy rate in the United States from 1899 to 1970. The 1920s marked 
the beginning of the long run trend of increasing bankruptcy rates that continued, with brief 
interruptions, into the Twenty-first Century. Rather than creating a crisis in wage earner bankruptcy 
the beginning of the Great Depression was one of these brief interruptions, as was the recession in 
the late 1930s. Analysis of wage earner bankruptcy rates from 1926 to 1932 will not directly answer   9
questions about how people would respond to changes in current legal rules.  The period should 
not, however, be regarded as an aberration so far as bankruptcy is concerned. 
 
II. Existing Evidence on Legal Rules and Bankruptcy Rates 
The effect of legal rules on the bankruptcy rate can only be determined empirically.  To see 
why, decompose the bankruptcy rate (r) into its component parts:  b d i r × × = .  The fraction of the 
population that petitions for bankruptcy is the product of the fraction of the population that is 
indebted (i), the fraction of the indebted population that defaults (d), and the fraction of the 
defaulting population that chooses bankruptcy (b). The greater the supply of credit, the larger is the 
fraction of the population at risk for default and bankruptcy. Other things equal, larger exemptions 
decrease the expected profit for the creditor, but increase the expected benefit for the debtor.  
Consequently, higher exemptions increase the demand for credit but decrease the supply.  Higher 
exemptions are therefore expected to increase the interest rate, but may increase or decrease the 
quantity of loans depending upon the relative size of the shifts in demand and supply.
 6  Thus theory 
offers no a priori prediction about how changing the cost of bankruptcy might alter the quantity of 
loans or the bankruptcy rate.   
The effect of the severity of garnishment law is also ambiguous.  Increasing the wage 
exemption in garnishment (making garnishment more lenient from a debtor’s perspective) increases 
the probability that a defaulting debtor chooses garnishment rather than bankruptcy, and makes 
borrowing more attractive.  But, because higher wage exemptions make lending less attractive, the 
net effect on the bankruptcy rate is unclear.   If a state makes it easier for a creditor to garnish a 
debtor’s wages, then the law becomes more severe from a debtor’s perspective.  Creditors may be 
                                                 
6 Several recent studies have examined the effect of exemptions on the supply and demand for credit. High exemptions 
have a negative effect on the supply of credit to households (Gropp et al., 1997; Lin and White, 2001) and to small 
businesses (Berkowitz and White, 2004).  Exemptions do not affect mortgage loans (Berkowitz and Hynes, 1999).   10
more willing to lend, but debtors may be less willing to borrow.  Similarly, the effect of differences 
in filing fees and other costs of bankruptcy, such as social stigma, can only be determined empirically 
because they cause the supply and demand for credit to move in opposite directions.  
As the early reports on bankruptcy filings under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act came in, 
contemporary observers claimed that differences in state laws drove the differences in bankruptcy 
rates.  In 1905, The Annual Report of the Attorney General laid the blame for Alabama’s high bankruptcy 
rate on its collection laws, explaining that because of “a State statute affecting the right to attach or 
garnish wages or salary of the laboring class, hundreds of poor unfortunates with liabilities in many 
instances less than $500, have been driven to seek relief under the Federal law as a matter of 
preservation” (U.S. Department of Justice, 1905:95).   Throughout most of the twentieth century 
people continued to point to variation in state legal rules as the source of variation in state 
bankruptcy rates (e.g. Stanley and Girth, 1971). However, pinning down the statistical relationship 
between legal rules and bankruptcy rates proved difficult.   
Studies using times series data attributed the rapid increase in the national bankruptcy rate 
after 1978 to a decrease in fees and an increase in exemptions associated with the enactment of the 
Code (Sheperd, 1984; Boyes and Faith, 1986).  Part of the increase in the bankruptcy rate was likely 
due to changes in the way filings were counted and to macroeconomic changes (Domowitz and 
Eovaldi, 1993).  Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Reform Act was not the only relevant legal change 
that occurred in the late 1970s.  David Moss and Gibbs Johnson (1999) observed that in 1977 the 
Supreme Court ruled that laws prohibiting lawyers from advertising were unconstitutional, and in 
1978 the Court ruled that usury limits on credit cards were determined by the state from which the 
card was issued not by the state in which the card holder lived.  The first decision made people more 
aware of bankruptcy and bankruptcy lawyers. The second decision increased the supply of consumer 
credit.  Both rulings would be expected to increase the bankruptcy rate.   11
In early econometric studies using cross sections, garnishment laws and exemption rates in 
bankruptcy appeared to be important determinants of state and district bankruptcy rates (Apilado et 
al., 1978; Heck, 1981; White, 1987).  Severe garnishment law (when a lower percentage of wages 
were exempt from collection) increased the bankruptcy rate.  In general, lower exemptions in 
bankruptcy reduced the bankruptcy rate.  Exemption levels also influenced the choice between 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy (White, 1998; Nelson, 1999).  Recent studies used samples of 
credit card holders and reinforced the results from geographic cross sections. More severe 
garnishment law decreased the likelihood of default but increased the likelihood that a person who 
defaulted chose bankruptcy (Dawsey and Ausubel, 2002; Agarwal et al., 2003).  Higher exemptions 
increased the likelihood that a person defaulted and filed for bankruptcy (Agarwal et al., 2003).  The 
results are reinforced in a study of small business bankruptcy (Agarwal et al, 2005).  
In contrast, several studies of bankruptcy rates in the 1980s and 1990s used panel data and 
failed to find a statistically significant relationship between garnishment law and bankruptcy rates 
(Shiers and Williamson, 1987; Weiss et al., 2001), or between exemption laws and bankruptcy rates 
(Buckley and Brinig, 1998; Weiss et al., 2001).  These studies found that economic and social 
variables explained more of the variation in bankruptcy rates. 
Buckley and Brining (1998) argued that holding traditional values regarding commitment and 
membership in a community decreased the bankruptcy rate by decreasing the likelihood of default.  
They posited that social capital was greater in more elderly and more Catholic populations, and that 
social capital was lower in more urban populations and populations with higher divorce rates.  Their 
measures of social capital were correlated with the bankruptcy rate.
7 
However, the interpretation of these social capital variables is problematic.  Membership in a 
religious group may, for instance, provide a place to turn to when things go wrong; church 
                                                 
7 These findings are consistent with recent work that shows the importance of relationship banking to the supply of 
credit to the poor (Holmes et al 2005).    12
membership provides insurance against decreases in consumption when income falls (Dehejia et al., 
2005).  The life-cycle theory of savings suggests that older populations would be less indebted and 
have lower bankruptcy rates regardless of their beliefs about commitment.  Divorce, like poor 
health, negatively affects the household balance sheet (Warren and Tyagi, 2003; Lyons and Yilmazer 
2005).  
Because of the difficulty of measuring social capital directly, some authors looked at the 
dynamic effects of bankruptcy filings to infer the effect of social capital.  For example, other things 
equal, households became more likely to default as the bankruptcy rate rose during the 1980s (Gross 
and Souleles, 2002), and individual households were more likely to file for bankruptcy in states that 
had higher bankruptcy rates in the past (Fay et al., 2002).  These patterns are consistent with the idea 
that the social stigma of bankruptcy fell as bankruptcy became more common, but they are also 
consistent with the idea that increased information about bankruptcy lowered the cost of filing.
8   
A final vein of research emphasized economic variables as the primary determinants of the 
bankruptcy rate. Weiss, Bhandari, and Robins (2001) argued that variables measuring debt-paying 
capacity explained much of the variation in state bankruptcy rates between 1980 and 1991. Elizabeth 
Warren and her coauthors also focused on household debt loads and ability to pay.  They argued 
that increased economic instability at the household level (Sullivan et al., 1989; 2000), and the 
pressure to purchase a home in a good neighborhood in order to obtain access to quality schools 
and a safe environment (Warren and Tyagi, 2003) drove the increases in bankruptcy rates in the 
1980s and 1990s.  That the probability of bankruptcy was lower where unemployment benefits were 
more generous also supported an emphasis on debt paying capacity (Fisher, 2005). 
                                                 
8 An additional problem with the Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) study is that bankruptcy appears to be dramatically 
under-represented in their household survey sample. Warren and Tyagi (2003) argue that the undercount is the result of 
reluctance to admit to filing for bankruptcy, which itself suggests that considerable stigma still exists.   13
Perhaps social and economic variables matter more today than in the past, while legal rules 
matter less.
9  But perhaps the statistical insignificance of legal rules in panel studies is an artifact of 
the econometric technique employed.  Traditional fixed effects models (Buckley and Brinig, 1998; 
Weiss et al., 2001) are unlikely to find a statistically significant effect of legal rules.  Again, in these 
models, the unit-fixed effects absorb the impact of initial differences in the legal rules; the estimated 
coefficients on the legal rules only reflect the impact of later changes in the rules. If bankruptcy 
exemptions and garnishment laws changed frequently this would not present a problem.  But, as 
described above, the legal rules seldom changed. 
 
III. Capturing the Effect of Legal Rules on Bankruptcy 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To estimate the relative impact of balance sheet variables, social capital, and legal rules on 
bankruptcy rates we use a panel of state-level data for the years 1926-1932.  The period has several 
features to recommend it for a study of bankruptcy rates.  Again, the period precedes federal 
restrictions on state laws so there is ample variation in legal rules between the states.  Additionally, 
there exists for this period an independent estimate of the severity of garnishment law that takes into 
consideration the difficulty of obtaining payment through garnishment, in addition to the percentage 
of wages exempt.  Finally, the period includes the business cycle prior to the Depression, as well as 
the first part of the depression, which enables us to consider the impact of rapidly changing 
macroeconomic conditions on bankruptcy rates.
10   
The specific end points were determined by the availability of data.  Annual state level data 
on divorce rates and wealth are not available for the first half of the 1920s.   Meanwhile, bankruptcy 
                                                 
9 Hynes (2006) provides evidence for Virginia and Illinois that suggests garnishment may be less relevant as a collection 
remedy than in the past. 
10 Peaks in October 1926 and August 1929, troughs in November 1927 and March 1933.     14
cases were not reported by occupation for 1933 through 1939 because a 1933 amendment to the 
Bankruptcy Act resulted in changes in the method of collecting and reporting data (U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, various years).  Finally, while legal rules seldom change, there exists no comparable, detailed 
study of garnishment law that would allow the current analysis to be extended into the post-war 
years.  
The number of bankruptcy cases filed, by occupation, is reported in the Annual Reports of the 
Attorney General (U.S. Dept. of Justice, various years).  We use as the dependent variable the 
bankruptcy rate per 100,000 persons in the state.  Population figures are interpolated from the 
census (University of Virginia, n.d.).   
The macroeconomic indicators used here are the level and growth in per capita state income 
(Flood, 1998).  A positive effect of growth would be consistent with the emphasis of Theresa 
Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook on economic uncertainty as a cause of bankruptcy 
(Sullivan et al., 1989). 
Figure 2 shows the average bankruptcy rates in states with the highest and lowest per capita 
incomes.  States with the highest per capita income have lower bankruptcy rates; states with the 
lowest per capita income have the highest bankruptcy rates. 
Balance sheet indicators included here are the ratio of bank loans to aggregate state personal 
income (Flood ,1998) and registered vehicles per 100 persons in the state (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, various years).  We expect higher debt-to-income ratios to be associated with higher 
bankruptcy rates.  The number of automobiles is likely to be a determinant of bankruptcy rates for 
two reasons. First, much of the consumer credit extended during the 1920s was for the purchase of 
automobiles (Olney, 1991), so higher rates of automobile ownership are likely to be associated with 
higher levels of indebtedness and bankruptcy. Second, observers during the 1920s pointed to 
automobile accidents—and the liability judgments stemming from them—as a significant source of   15
unanticipated debt (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1931:25). Table 3 gives the average bankruptcy 
rate for the period in the states with the highest and lowest debt-to-income ratios and highest and 
lowest number of automobiles. Without controlling for other factors, we cannot find a systematic 
difference in bankruptcy between the states based upon the number of vehicles. 
We were particularly concerned that there might be correlation between state income and 
debt load.  Correlations are modest, however.  The Pearson correlation coefficient between real state 
per capita income and debt-to-income ratio is 0.4; the correlation coefficient between real per capita 
income and vehicle registration is 0.3.   
  Social capital variables used here are chosen for comparison to Buckley and Brinig (1998). In 
some specifications we include the percent of the state population that is Roman Catholic, but we 
focus on the percent of the state population that belongs to any religious body (U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce and Labor, 1930; 1940).  The original sources of the data are surveys of churches 
conducted at ten year intervals.  The annual observations are interpolated assuming a constant rate 
of change between surveys.  If Buckley and Brinig (1998) are correct, Roman Catholic values 
decrease bankruptcy.  If church membership provides a source of insurance, then greater 
membership of the population of a state in any congregation reduces bankruptcy rates.  
  Figure 3 shows the negative relationship between church membership and the bankruptcy 
rate.  There is an average difference is about 10 bankruptcies per 100,000 people between states with 
the lowest church membership rates and states with the highest rates.  The gap is larger between 
states with the smallest and largest Roman Catholic populations.  These differences are intriguing 
and warrant further study, but a detailed examination is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
We consider the influence of the divorce rate, measured as divorces per 1,000 persons (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, various years) and the percent of state population that is urban (U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, various years).  Degree of urbanization is expected to be positively correlated with the   16
bankruptcy rate because credit may be more readily available in urban areas or because relatively 
anonymous urban debtors may feel less stigmatized from filing for bankruptcy.  As noted above, a 
higher divorce rate may indicate a lack of commitment, or divorce may negatively impact the 
household balance sheet.  In either case, a higher divorce rate is expected to increase bankruptcy.  
Table 3 shows, however, that before controlling for other factors, divorce and urbanicity are 
negatively correlated with the bankruptcy rate. 
  The legal rules examined here include the size of the homestead exemption relative to per 
capita real estate wealth (Goodman, 1993; Wickens, 1936; National Association of Credit Men, 
various years, U.S. Bureau of the Census, various years), personal exemption relative to per capita 
personal wealth (National Association of Credit Men, various years), and the severity of garnishment 
law in the state (Nugent et al., 1936; see below).  We also include the usury rate (Ryan, 1924) and a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether the state had a small loan law (Nugent, 1934).  The legal 
rules for each state are shown in Appendix A. 
Homestead exemptions, in states that defined the exemption in dollar terms, varied from 
zero to $8,000.  Personal exemptions ranged from zero to $2,000.  The average state had an 
exemption-to-wealth ratio of a bit over 4, and the variation in the ratio was large.  Recall that the 
effect of exemptions on the bankruptcy rate is ambiguous because generous state exemptions 
increase the demand for loans but decrease the supply.  Figure 4 shows that personal exemptions 
had greater impact on wage earner bankruptcy than homestead exemptions, and that the states with 
the highest personal property exemptions had higher bankruptcy rates.  That the homestead 
exemption had little impact on wage earner bankruptcy is consistent with contemporary observation 
that the bankrupt wage earner was unlikely to own much of value for creditors to seize. 
Other laws that may affect the supply of credit, indebtedness, default, and bankruptcy are 
state usury laws and the passage of the Uniform Small Loan Law.  We include the legal maximum   17
interest rate, which is the rate that a creditor was allowed to charge when the rate was not explicitly 
stated in a contract (Ryan, 1924; see also Nugent, 1934; Robinson and Nugent, 1935).
11  The 
maximum legal interest rate ranged from five to eight percent.  It is not clear to what extent the 
restrictions were actually binding (Ryan, 1924), but to the extent that usury limits were binding, they 
inhibited the ability of lenders to respond to increased risk by increasing interest rates. Consequently, 
they were likely to reduce the supply of formal credit available to wage earners and reduce the 
bankruptcy rate.  Figure 5 shows that states with higher usury limits had higher bankruptcy rates on 
average.   
The belief that usury laws drove low-income, high-risk borrowers to loan sharks prompted 
the Russell Sage foundation to draft and promote a Uniform Small Loan Law beginning in 1913 
(Robinson and Nugent, 1935).  The small loan law offered an exception to the usury law. Lenders 
who complied with the regulations set forth in the law were allowed to charge higher interest rates 
for loans under $600. About half of all states passed a version of the uniform small loan law by 1933 
(Nugent, 1934).  Figure 6 shows that states without a small loan law had slightly higher rates than 
states with special provisions for small loans. 
The severity of state garnishment law was assessed by Nugent, Hamm, and Jones (1936) as 
part of a broad study of consumer credit conditions that commenced in 1934.  They considered 
many aspects of garnishment law, from the fraction of wages that were exempt to the difficulty of 
actually receiving a payoff through garnishment.  The study categorized state garnishment laws as 
being severe, limited, or lenient from the perspective of the debtor. Severe laws were ones that did 
not appear to leave enough for the support of a wage earner’s family; limited laws left an adequate 
amount for support of a family; ineffective laws were ones in which wages were generally not subject 
to garnishment. The Nugent, Hamm and Jones study covered 23 states; we classified an additional 
                                                 
11 Wyoming was the only state to change its usury rate during the 1920s.    18
seven states through comparison with other sources (Sturges and Cooper, 1933; Douglas, 1933; 
National Association of Credit Men, various years).  We compare states with severe (pro-creditor) 
and lenient (pro-debtor) garnishment law to states with garnishment laws that these scholars 
reported had limited impact. On the face of it, the severity of garnishment law appears to explain 
much of the difference in the bankruptcy rates between the states.  States with severe laws had some 
of the highest bankruptcy rates while many states with lenient laws had very low rates.  Figure 7 
shows the bankruptcy rate in states with severe garnishment rules and lenient garnishment laws.  On 
average, states with severe garnishment had bankruptcy rates nine times larger than states with 
lenient garnishment law.   
We considered whether legal rules were co-determined; that is, we thought states might have 
consistently pro-debtor or pro-creditor rules.  Examination of Appendix A, though, makes it clear 
that states did not have coordinated legal rules.  Only Colorado took a strictly pro-creditor stance: 
no small loan law, the highest usury limit, low personal exemptions, and severe garnishment law.  
Louisiana was the only state with a strictly pro-debtor stance: a small loan law, a usury limit of five 
percent, personal exemptions over $2,000, and limited garnishment. 
Consider now the pooled cross-sectional time-series regression model 
  st st st st L X r ε γ β α + + + = , (1)   
where rst is the wage earner bankruptcy rate in each state s and year t.  The vector Xst includes 
macroeconomic indicators, balance sheet indicators, and social capital indicators that vary over time 
in each state and have been found to influence the bankruptcy rate.  The vector Lst includes legal 
variables, such as the exemptions in bankruptcy and the severity of garnishment law.
12    
                                                 
12 Because the bankruptcy rate can be thought of as the number of filings out of the population of people who might 
file, we also considered a binomial regression specification.  The binomial specification did not fit the data well and are 
not presented here.   19
Table 4 shows the results of the model in (1).  The number of observations is limited mainly 
by the availability of the data on legal rules. Of a possible 357 observations, 140 are lost because 20 
states are not included in the independent rating of severity of garnishment law; additional states are 
lost because the way personal exemptions are described in state laws make them non-comparable.  
We found, however, no statistically significant difference between states included in the regression 
and those excluded.   
The first columns of table 4 show the regressions with the wage earner bankruptcy rate as 
the dependent variable. Because of leftward skew in the distribution of wage earner bankruptcy 
rates, we also consider the semi-log specification; the results are shown in the final columns of table 
4.  After correcting for within-state heteroskedasticity, the residuals are approximately normally 
distributed in all specifications. The regression results are consistent with the descriptive statistics 
discussed above.  The level of per capita income is modestly and negatively associated with the 
bankruptcy rate, but growth is not.  The balance sheet variables have little measurable impact.  Of 
the social capital variables, church membership is the most important, and it is the only one that is 
statistically significant in all specifications. 
Legal rules, especially garnishment law, drive the bankruptcy rate.  Doubling income from 
the average of $443 would be expected to decrease the bankruptcy rate by 13, but switching from an 
ineffective to lenient garnishment law is expected to decrease the bankruptcy rate by 19 bankruptcies 
per 100,000 persons. 
The pooled cross-section time series approach may be warranted if concern over omitted 
variables bias is minimal.  Given that the models presented in table 4 explain a majority of the 
variation in the bankruptcy rate, it may be tempting to consider the case solved.  However, we are 
unable to capture the effects of many economic, social, and legal variables that could influence 
bankruptcy.  These include, but are not limited to, industrial structure, immigration, and, especially,   20
the operation of the district bankruptcy courts themselves.  Relying on pooled OLS does not offer a 
way to reduce the bias from these omitted variables. Of course, it is well known that excluding an 
independent variable that is correlated with the dependent variable creates bias unless the excluded 
variable and the included variables are orthogonal to each other.  It is the same for fixed effects that 
are excluded despite correlation with the dependent variable.  It seems, therefore, unlikely that our 
results in table 4 are unbiased, especially for such a small number of observations. 
We allow for state fixed effects to capture the state-specific variation in these omitted 
variables.  The fixed effects model is  
  st s st st u X r ε β α + + + = , (2) 
where rst is the wage earner bankruptcy rate in each state s and year t.  The vector Xst includes 
macroeconomic indicators, balance sheet indicators, and social capital indicators that vary over time 
in each state and have been found to influence the bankruptcy rate.  The results of the fixed effects 
specification appears in the first column of table 5.   
In the fixed effects specification, of the economic, balance sheet, and social capital variables, 
only the church membership and divorce have detectable effects.  The ratio of personal exemptions, 
which is driven by changes in the value of wealth over the period, has a positive impact on the 
bankruptcy rate. 
The vector of state-specific but time-invariant legal variables, such as the severity of 
garnishment law, are perfectly colinear with the state-specific fixed effect us and cannot be estimated 
in the basic fixed effects framework.  In this case, random effects may serve as a viable second best 
option, even if the Hausman test suggested that random effects are inconsistent (Pluemper and 
Troeger, forthcoming).  The random effects results are shown in the second column of table 5. 
Random effects estimation yields signs that are consistent with the signs of the coefficients 
in the pooled OLS specification, but random effects is unable to find any clear relationships in the   21
data, except for a weakly significant and negative relationship between the homestead exemptions 
and the bankruptcy rate.  Recall, however, that random effects (1) requires strict exogeneity and 
orthogonality between included independent variables and the random effect, and that (2) random 
effects models share the poor small sample properties of all generalized least squares techniques. As 
a consequence, we are skeptical of the random effects estimates. 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggest using instruments for the variables that are likely to be 
correlated with the random effects.  The Hausman-Taylor results, assuming exogenity of the legal 
rules, are presented in the final column of table 5.  Again, the standard errors of the estimates are 
large.  However, most signs (but not) are again consistent with the pooled OLS results. Finally, like 
most instrumental variables techniques, the results of the Hausman-Taylor procedure are highly 
sensitive to our choices about which variables are endogenous and which variables.   
 
An Augmented Fixed-Effects Procedure 
Fixed effect vector decomposition is a new procedure that allows us to retain the desirable features 
of the fixed effects framework without losing information about the time-invariant legal rules in the 
process (Pluemper and Troeger, forthcoming).  The model is  
  st s s st st u L X r ε γ β α + + + + = , (3) 
where rst is the wage earner bankruptcy rate in each state s and year t.  The vector Xst includes 
macroeconomic indicators, balance sheet indicators, and social capital indicators that vary over time 
in each state.  The vector Ls includes state-specific but time-invariant (or nearly time-invariant) legal 
variables, such as the exemptions in bankruptcy and the severity of garnishment law.  The state-
specific fixed effect us is assumed to be correlated with at least one of the variables in X and one of 
the variables in L.   22
  Fixed effect vector decomposition is a three-stage estimation procedure.  The first stage 
estimates the usual fixed effects model, as in the first column of table 5.  The within-estimator 
identifies the state effect as the part of the mean of the state bankruptcy rate that cannot be 
explained by the time-varying variables: 
  β ˆ ˆ s s s x r u − = . (4)   
The second stage of the procedure estimates by OLS the effect of the time-invariant elements of L 
on the fixed effects, 
  , ˆ s s s l u υ γ φ + + =  (5) 
where φ  is a constant term and  s υ  is an error term.  In the third stage, after adjusting the degrees of 
freedom, the results from the second stage estimation are included in a pooled OLS re-estimation of 
the model, so that  
  st s s st st l x r ε υ γ β α + + + + = . (6) 
The inclusion of  s υ  in the final stage accounts for the part of the original state effect that is due to 
still-omitted variables.  The coefficient on  s υ  is expected to equal one after correction for 
heteroscedasticty or serial correlation.    Pluemper and Troeger (forthcoming) show that this 
procedure has nicer finite sample properties than alternatives already discussed for estimating the 
effect of time-invariant variables using panel data. 
Table 6 shows the results of the fixed effect vector decomposition procedure. By accounting 
for both time-varying and time-invariant explanatory variables using fixed effect vector 
decomposition, we are able to explain 90 percent of the variation in bankruptcy rates (table 3).
13  In 
specification (1) of table 6 the levels of the homestead and personal exemptions are treated as 
(nearly) time-invariant.  They are not included in the fixed effect specification of the first stage, but 
                                                 
13 Such a high R2 led us to suspect serial correlation of course, but the Durbin-Watson test was inconclusive.  Results 
with an AR(1) correction are not substantively different from those presented in table 3.   23
the effects of the exemptions are instead decomposed from the state fixed effect in the second stage 
(equation (5) above) and included in the pooled estimation of the third stage (equation (6)).  The 
level of personal exemptions has a positive and statistically significant effect on the bankruptcy rate, 
but after controlling for state macroeconomic conditions, the level of the homestead exemption is 
negatively correlated with the bankruptcy rate.
14   
In specifications (2) through (4) the homestead and personal exemptions are considered 
relative to per capital real estate and personal wealth in the state.  The ratio of exemptions to wealth 
more directly measures the generosity of bankruptcy law because average wealth varies greatly across 
states.  Changes in the value of assets during this period generated substantial variation within states 
across time.  The higher the ratio of the homestead exemption to average real estate wealth, the 
lower the bankruptcy rate, and the effect is again statistically significant.   
As discussed above, the representative wage earner was more likely to be concerned with the 
personal exemption.  As the personal exemption relative to average wealth increased, so did the 
bankruptcy rate.  The effect of this ratio is positive and statistically significant in each specification. 
Specification (3) differs from specifications (1) and (2) in its measurement of the social 
capital indicator for religion.  Recall that Buckley and Brinig (1998) suggested that a Roman Catholic 
population would value fulfilling commitments and would therefore have a lower bankruptcy rate.  
Other studies suggested that church membership, regardless of the specific congregation, would 
provide insurance against negative income shocks.  Specifications (1) and (2) include the general 
measure of church membership.  Greater church membership is associated with lower bankruptcy 
rates, and the effect is statistically significant.  A larger Roman Catholic population (specification 3) 
is also associated with a lower bankruptcy rate, but the effect is smaller.  Thus the data for 1926-
1932 lend some evidence that membership in any religious congregation, rather than a specific one, 
                                                 
14 The residuals are approximately normal.  Semi-log and log-log specifications return similar results.   24
provided benefits in times of distress.  Again, we defer further consideration of this phenomenon to 
another paper. 
In specifications (2) and (3) there is a small, but statistically significant, association between 
the level of real per capita income and the bankruptcy rate, indicating that the supply of credit to 
wage earners was likely greater in richer states.  The annual growth in state real per capita income is 
not statistically associated with the bankruptcy rate.  Specification (4) shows that the insignificance 
of macroeconomic fluctuations is not an artifact of non-linearity in the relationship between growth 
and bankruptcy.  The coefficients on the squares of income and growth are not statistically different 
from zero. 
In all four specifications shown in table 6, the two balance sheet indicators—the ratio of 
total bank loans to aggregate state personal income and the number of registered vehicles per 100 
persons in the state—are consistently and positively associated with the bankruptcy rate.  That is, 
greater indebtedness led to greater risk of bankruptcy.   
The divorce rate, too, is consistently and positively associated with the bankruptcy rate.  This 
may be due to the negative impact of divorce on the household balance sheet, or it may indicate a 
more casual attitude towards fulfilling commitments.  Similarly, the effect of urbanization on 
bankruptcy rates is consistently positive.  It may be that stigma is less in urban areas, or it may be 
that loans are more readily available there.   
Of the state legal rules included, the effect that is least robust to specification is the effect of 
the existence of a small loan law.  States with small loan laws have lower bankruptcy rates in each of 
the specifications.  However, in specification (2) the effect of the small loan law is not statistically   25
significant.  Moreover, the estimated coefficients range widely, with the 95 percent confidence 
intervals encompassing the range from -34 to -4.
15   
In contrast, higher usury limits are consistently associated with higher bankruptcy rates.  The 
effect of the usury limit is quite large.  A step-up in the usury limit of one percentage point is 
associated with an increase in the bankruptcy rate of between 8 and 18 filings per 100,000 people; 
compare this to the average rate of 22.2 per 100,000 or the median rate of 14.6 per 100,000.  A 
move from the lowest to the highest usury limit (from 5 to 8 percent) could thus move a state from 
the bottom to the top quartile in terms of its bankruptcy rate. 
The severity of garnishment law explains much of the difference between state bankruptcy 
rates.  The bankruptcy rate in a state with a severe garnishment law is predicted to be higher than the 
rate in an otherwise identical state with lenient law by between 29 and 37 filings per 100,000 persons 
in the state.  (Compare the coefficients on severe and lenient garnishment in specifications (1) and 
(2).)  As is the case with legal limits on interest, a switch in legal rules from lenient garnishment to 
severe garnishment could move a state from the 25
th percentile to the top quartile in terms of the 
bankruptcy rate.  Or consider it this way: if all states had adopted lenient garnishment rules before 
1926, we would expect the average state bankruptcy rate for the period to have been 13.5 rather than 
22.2. 
Taken together, the results in table 6 tell a persuasive story about the importance of legal 
rules in determining bankruptcy rates.  Differences in the legal rules governing how easily a creditor 
could collect from a wage earner in default explain most of the variation in bankruptcy rates 
between states from 1926 through 1932.  Alternations in state-specific legal rules, especially rules 
                                                 
15 Terms interacting the effect of the small loan law and the other legal variables were not statistically significant.   We 
also considered the possibility that state laws were correlated, that is, we considered whether states could be categorized 
as pro-debtor or pro-creditor by looking at their policies as whole.  They cannot.  The correlation coefficient between 
homestead and personal exemptions is 0.43; the correlation between the usury rate and personal exemptions is 0.33.  
States with a lenient garnishment law have higher ratios of homestead exemptions to real estate wealth (p-value<.05), but 
do not have different ratios of personal exemptions to personal wealth.    26
affecting the supply of credit and creditors’ remedies, would have entirely changed the picture of 
bankruptcy in the United States.  Changes in social capital and balance sheet indicators also 
influenced bankruptcy rates, but it would have required relatively large changes in these variables to 
have changed the national picture of bankruptcy.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
A comparison of our results with studies using more recent data suggests avenues for further 
research. The most striking difference, of course, is that using fixed effect vector decomposition we 
consistently find a strong relationship between garnishment law and bankruptcy rates for 1926-1932, 
whereas some studies using recent data are unable to identify such a relationship.  A fresh look at 
the data for the 1980s and 1990s using fixed effect vector decomposition will tell us whether the 
divergence in results is caused by a decline in the importance of garnishment laws or by the 
differences in econometric techniques.  
Our results also provide support for an argument made by David Skeel (1998).  In his study 
of corporate reorganization, Skeel found that bankruptcy law cannot be understood in isolation 
from other laws, but must be examined in the context of the regulatory environment.  Our work 
shows that in the case of wage earner bankruptcy, bankruptcy law must be examined in the context 
of state garnishment laws, exemption laws, and usury laws. The same federal bankruptcy law can 
produce dramatically different outcomes in different states depending on the legal context.  
Finally, although differences in legal rules are the most important factor in determining 
differences in bankruptcy rates from 1926-32, the impact of the social variables, particularly church 
membership, is also robust. The mechanisms by which these social capital variables influence 
bankruptcy rates require further exploration.   27
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AL 2000  1000 Severe 8 No 
AR 2500 700 Ineffective 6 No 
AZ 4000 n/a Not  Ranked 6 Yes 
CA 5000 
B  Ineffective 7
I 
CO 2000 200 Severe 8 No 
CT 1000 
B  Not Ranked 6 Yes 
DC 0  700 Not  Ranked 6 No 
DE 0  250 Not  Ranked 6 No 
FL 
A  1000 Ineffective 8 Yes 
GA 1600  1600 Severe 7 Yes 
IA 
A B  Not Ranked 6 Yes 
ID 5000  1300 Not  Ranked 7 No 
IL 1000  400 Severe 5 Yes 
IN 600  1200 Ineffective 6 Yes 
KS 
A B  Severe 6 No 
KY 1000 
B  Severe 6 No 
LA 2000 
B  Limited 5
J 
MA 800  100 Limited 6 Yes 
MD 0  100 Ineffective 6 Yes 
ME 500 
B  Severe 6 Yes 
MI 1500 
C  Severe 5 Yes 
MN 
A  0 Severe 6 No 
MO 1500  400 Limited 6
K 
MS 3000 250 Not  Ranked 6 No 
MT 2500 
B  Not Ranked 8 No 
NC 1000 500 Ineffective 6 No 
ND 8000 
D  Ineffective 6 No 
NE 2000 500 Not  Ranked 7 No 
NH 500 200 Not  Ranked 6 Yes 
NJ 1000 200 Limited 6 Yes 
NM 1000  500 Not  Ranked 6 No 
NV 5000 
E  Ineffective 7 No 
NY 1000 250 Limited 6 Yes 
OH 1000 
F  Limited 6 Yes 
OK 5000 
B  Not Ranked 6 No 
OR 3000 275 Severe 6 Yes 
PA 0  300 Ineffective 6 Yes 
RI 0 
B  Not Ranked 6 Yes 
SC 1000 
G  Ineffective 7 No 
SD 5000 750 Not  Ranked 7 No 
TN 1000 
B  Severe 6 Yes 
TX 5000 
B  Ineffective 6 No   35
UT 2000 
B  Not Ranked 8 Yes 
VA 2000  2000 Severe 6 Yes 
VT 1000 
H  Not Ranked 6 No 
WA 
A  500 Ineffective 6 No 
WI 5000 400 Not  Ranked 6
K 
WV 1000  200 Not  Ranked 6 Yes 
WY 2500 1250 Not  Ranked 8 0 
Sources: See text. 
Notes: 
A Homestead exemption defined in acres. 
B Personal exemption itemized. 
C Decreased from 850 to 500 in 1932. 
D Increased from 1000 to 1500 in 1932. 
E Increased from 2200 to 3200 in 1932. 
F Increased from 250 to 1000 in 1932. 
G Decreased from 800 to 500 in 1932. 
H Established dollar amount equal to 400 in 1932. 
I Passed in 1931. 
J Passed in 1932. 
K Passed in 1927. 
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 Table 1.  Homestead Exemptions in 1883, 1920 and 1932 (in dollars) 
 
  Year 
 1883 1920 1932
AL 2000 2000 2000
AR 2500 2500 2500
AZ 5000 4000 4000
CA 5000 5000 5000
CT n.a. 1000 1000
GA 1600 1600 1600
ID 500 5000 5000
IL 1000 1000 1000
IN 600 600 600
KY 1000 1000 1000
LA 2000 2000 2000
MA 800 800 800
ME 500 500 500
MO 1500 1500 1500
MS 2000 3000 3000
NC 1000 1000 1000
NE 2000 2000 2000
NH 500 500 500
NJ 1000 1000 1000
NM 1000 1000 1000
NV 5000 5000 5000
NY 1000 1000 1000
OH 1000 1000 1000
OK 5000 5000 5000
PA 300 300 300
SC 1000 1000 1000
TN 1000 1000 1000
TX 5000 5000 5000
UT 1000 1500 2000
VA 2000 2000 2000
VT 500 500 1000
WV 1000 1000 1000
WY 1000 2500 2500
Sources: See text.   37






Mean  Standard  
Deviation 
Wage Earner Bankruptcy 
Number of Filings  349  475.95  619.54 
Filing Rate per 100,000 Persons  349  22.18  22.85 
 
Macroeconomic Indicators 
Per Capita Income (1920$s)  336  443.35  196.80 
Annual Income Growth (%)  336  -9.36  13.76 
      
Balance Sheet Indicators 
Ratio of Bank Loans to State Income 336  .40  .15 
Registered Vehicles per 100 Persons  343  21.29  6.44 
      
Social Capital Indicators 
Catholics (% of Pop.)  329  15.03  11.91 
Church Members (% of Pop.)  336  43.29  10.82 
Divorces per 1,000 Persons*  327  2.19  4.66 
Urban (% of Pop.)  343  46.61  21.05 
      
Legal Rules 
Homestead Exemption ($)  315  2073  1811 
Personal Exemption ($)  239  656  552 
Homestead Exemption/Per Capita  
Real Estate Wealth  288 4.10  5.34 
Personal Exemption/Per Capita  
Personal Wealth  189 4.52  5.76 
Maximum Legal Interest Rate  357  6.35  0.79 
Severe Garnishment Law  210  40% of states 
Lenient Garnishment Law  210  40% of states 
State Has Small Loan Law  357  48% of state-years 
Sources: See text. 
* May also be interpreted as a balance sheet indicator; see text.   38
Table 3. Balance Sheet Indicators, Social Capital Variables, and Bankruptcy Rates 
 
 Bankruptcy  Rate  in 
 
Lowest Quartile
 of States 
Highest Quartile
 of States 
24.7 24.0 
Ratio of Bank Loans to State Income 
(29.6) (20.5) 
29.5 21.8 
Registered Vehicles per 100 Persons 
(32.2) (17.9) 
15.4 9.7 
Divorces per 1,000 Persons 
(18.8) (9.9) 
21.3 13.1 
Percent of State Population in Urban Areas
(27.3) (9.97) 
Source: See text. 
Standard deviations in parentheses.  39
















Real Per Capita Income  -0.03 -0.08** -0.002** -0.003**
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Income Growth  16.78  18.14  1.187  0.470 
 (32.25)  (30.77)  (1.536)  (1.697) 
Loan to Income Ratio  0.01  0.01  0.002** 0.002**
 (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Registered Vehicles per 100 Persons  -0.38  -0.52  0.045*  0.028 
 (0.39)  (0.35)  (0.019)  (0.017) 
Church Members (% of Pop.)  -0.70** -0.75** -0.050** -0.048**
 (0.39)  (0.23)  (0.014)  (0.012) 
Divorces per 1,000 Persons  -0.57* -0.55*  -0.003  -0.003 
 (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Urban (% of Pop.)  0.09  0.55** 0.008  0.020**
 (0.23)  (0.22)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Homestead Exemption/Per Capita Real Estate 
Wealth  -1.06** -1.45** -0.044** -0.089**
 (0.42)  (0.35)  (0.020)  (0.019) 
Personal Exemption/Per Capita Personal Wealth  1.17** 0.96** 0.076** 0.063**
 (0.60)  (0.38)  (0.028)  (0.020) 
Maximum Interest Rate  5.03*  7.06** -0.085  -0.126 
 (2.92)  (2.58)  (0.138)  (0.142) 
State Has Small Loan Law  -3.17 -3.81  -0.402 -0.153 
 (5.04)  (4.76)  (0.237)  (0.262) 
Severe Garnishment Law  15.58**   0.388*   
 (5.79)    (0.242)   
Lenient Garnishment Law  -19.31**   -1.936**  
 (3.24)    (0.280)   
Year Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 133  187  133  187 
R
2 0.56  0.22  0.63  0.16 
 
* p-value<.05; ** p-value<.01.   Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: See text.   40
Table 5. Fixed Effects, Random Effects, and the Hausman-Taylor Procedure 
 
Dependent variable: Wage earner bankruptcies per 100,000 persons 






Real Per Capita Income  0.004  0.02  0.004 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Income Growth  -2.33  0.589  -13.12 
 (12.60)  (15.89)  (11.67) 
Loan to Income Ratio  0.02  0.03  0.02 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Registered Vehicles per 100 Persons  0.20  -0.49  0.87* 
 (0.62)  (0.61)  (0.52) 
Church Members (% of Pop.)  -3.78** -0.94  -3.06** 
 (0.87)  (0.57)  (0.86) 
Divorces per 1,000 Persons  0.39** 0.15  0.14 
 (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.34) 
Urban (% of Pop.)  -0.10  -0.38  -0.23 
 (1.76)  (0.27)  (0.90) 
Homestead Exemption/Per Capita Real Estate. Wealth -0.99  -0.87*  -0.14 
 (0.86)  (0.48)  (1.00) 
Personal Exemption/Per Capita Personal Wealth  0.31*  0.46  0.11 
 (0.55)  (0.31)  (0.59) 
Max. Interest Rate    7.83  -7.12 
   (7.27)  (8.73) 
State Has Small Loan Law    -2.22  -4.26 
   (5.22)  (16.15) 
Severe Garnishment Law  17.12  -8.44 
   (13.72)  (63.23) 
Lenient Garnishment Law    -20.39  -96.1 
   (13.24)  (75.50) 
Year Effects?  Yes  Yes  No 
N 133  133  125 
R2 0.04  0.53  0.93 
Wald Chi-Square    76.4  50.5 
* p-value<.05; ** p-value<.01.   Robust standard errors in parentheses.  N=125 in Hausman-Taylor 
specifications because the procedure requires a balanced panel. 
Sources: See text.   41
Table 6. Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition 
Dependent variable: Wage earner bankruptcies per 100,000 persons 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Real Per Capita Income  0.01  0.02* 0.03*  -0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Income Squared       0.01 
       (0.01) 
Income Growth  13.71  7.84 3.15  12.72 
  (16.94)  (12.63) (14.21) (16.43) 
Growth Squared       -0.53 
       (23.41) 
Loan to Income Ratio (x 1,000)  0.03**  0.03** 0.02** 0.03**
  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Registered Vehicles per 100 Persons  0.49*  0.43**  -0.08  0.68**
  (0.23)  (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) 
Church Members (% of Pop.)  -2.32**  -3.11**   -3.22**
  (0.189)  (0.24)   (0.26) 
Catholics (% of Pop.)     -1.88**   
     (0.19)   
Divorces per 1,000 Persons  0.22  0.31** 0.19*  0.31**
  (0.13)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Urban (% of Pop.)  1.23**  0.57** 1.26** 0.74**
  (0.149)  (0.09) (0.14)  0.12 
Level of Homestead Exemption  -0.001**    
  (0.001)     
Homestead Exemption/Per Capita Real Estate 
Wealth 
  -1.32** -0.88** -1.43**
    (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
Level of Personal Exemption  0.014**    
  (0.002)     
Personal Exemption/Per Capita Personal Wealth    0.67** 0.46*  0.76**
    (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
State Has Small Loan Law  -6.56*  -4.00 -32.44**  -4.70* 
  (3.50)  (2.53) (3.11) (2.61) 
Max. Legal Interest Rate  18.39**  12.99** 8.41**  13.71**
  (1.56)  (1.21) (1.20) (1.28) 
Severe Garnishment Law  29.55**  19.74** 33.37** 21.44**
  (3.08)  (2.63) (3.24) (2.69) 
Lenient Garnishment Law  -0.88  -16.96** -1.70  -14.80**
  (2.79)  (2.53) (2.68) (2.55) 
N  133  133 133 133 
R
2  0.93  0.93 0.92 0.90 
Year Effects?  Yes  Yes Yes Yes   42
* p-value<.05; ** p-value<.01.   Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: See text. 
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Sources: 1899-1938: US DOJ (various years); 1939-1997: US Bureau of the Census (various years).   44
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Sources: See text.  45
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Source: See text.  47
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No Small Loan Law
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Sources: See text.   49














Sources: See text. 